



IS NEW YORK THE WORLD'S LARGEST CITY?

AMERICA has the largest city in the world. Having robbed the English of the standard of world's exchange by replacing the pound sterling with the dollar and having again robbed the English of the honor of having the greatest shipping port in the world, America now robs the same nation of the honor of possessing the world's largest city.

Statistics recently published show that New York is now larger than London and is therefore the world's largest city. The population of Greater London today is in round numbers 7,300,000. The population of Greater New York is in round numbers 7,500,000. Therefore Greater New York has a margin of at least 200,000 over its great rival across the seas and stands as the most populous city in the world.

There is no question in the minds of statisticians that New York can hold the proud place she has so long been striving for. The great war is depleting London's population at a steady rate. At the same time it is, rapidly increasing New York's population. It will not be at all unlikely that within a few years the great metropolis of New York will have such a great margin in its favor that it will be out of the question for the great metropolis of London to hope to overtake her rival.

In considering the actual relative size of the metropolis called London and the metropolis called New York it has to be remembered that London spreads out in every direction and that although the

Metropolitan Parliamentary Boroughs combined do not comprise more than 117 square miles of territory against the 328 of Greater New York, what is called the metropolitan district of London comprises nearly 700 miles of territory.

The Metropolitan district of New York includes all of nearby New Jersey and much of Westchester county and its population is now larger than the similar district of London.

But London is London. The resident of Tooting and Shepherd's Bush gets his letters as a Londoner, harked S. W. or W. as the case may be. Yonkers and Hastings and Mount Vernon and Newark and Elizabeth are not New York.

Nevertheless a population of about 7,500,000 has developed not actually within its political boundaries but under the very influences, commercial and industrial, which have caused the rapid and amazing growth of the city itself, which nowadays is a restricted area of 328 square miles and contains a population variously estimated at from 5,253,885 to 5,583,571.

Comparisons of the population of London with that of New York, however, are very difficult. Even if there were an error in the 1911 estimate of population of the administrative county of London, which is of about the same area as the Metropolitan Parliamentary Boroughs, which would have shown it to be somewhat smaller than that of Greater New York, in that year, the increase of transit facilities in nearly every direction has been followed by an increase of dwellings in parts of London which until a compara-

tively few years ago were given over to market gardening.

London has not been standing still while New York has been growing. It is likely, however, that the population of the two cities, counting New York's outlying districts politically, but not socially or industrially separated from it, have been growing unequally in favor of New York. In that case New York is the largest city in the world in population as well as the greatest in industry, commerce and wealth.

As far as traffic goes New York as a city has a greater amount of traffic and vehicles according to statistics than London, and at the same time is in a far more chaotic condition than the English metropolis. London merely grew into chaos by reason of streets being built when they were needed. New York on the other hand sinned in its planning with its eyes open.

Because the Island of Manhattan is long and narrow the planners went out of their way to provoke, not relieve, congestion. The problems which have to be

solved in dealing with London's transportation are being solved by a man who learned his business in Detroit and in Newark, in the person of Sir Albert H. Stanley, chairman of the vast trust which, with the exception of the London County Council street cars, controls the traffic problem of the English capital.

For years the Speyer group of bankers had been gradually buying up the interests of the various subway and motor omnibus lines and reached their culminating effort about eighteen months ago when all the competing and conflicting interests were welded together. Prior to that time there had been competition as disastrous to the public as it was to the corporations.

Yet the difficulties of London are far greater than those of New York. Manhattan Island is a bowling alley—straight up and down. London traffic is centrifugal in the morning, centrifugal in the late afternoon. To and from the small square-mile center known as the City of London, the traffic comes and goes. City commuters live as far out as fifty or

seventy miles and all travelers enter by one of fifteen stations.

London's working hours are shorter. The rush hours are not of two or three hours in the morning as in New York, but commence at 9 a. m. and finish at 10:30 and similarly from 5 to 6:30 in the evening.

Into that little City of London, where less than 20,000 sleep at night, there enter every day over one million persons and one hundred thousand vehicles, not all the latter, of course, being passenger vehicles.

This exodus with all the surface congestion that it signified in the narrow old streets—for there is not one reasonably good street in the City of London—had to be borne in mind by Stanley when devising means for relieving the congestion.

The motor omnibus is the essence of London surface work. It is double-decked and holds thirty-four people. The strictest possible injunctions are given to the police not to allow one more than the thirty-four to take their place in the omnibus. Dismissal is the lot of the conductor whose negligence causes an infraction of the law. No franchise need be secured by any one who thinks there is money in the motor omnibus business.

Subject to the vehicles being safe and easily maneuvered the streets are as free as air to all who will. On the other hand the south side of the river Thames is the home of the middle and lower classes for whom the London County Council operates the street cars at a loss. And as the council is the body governing the police overcrowding on their street cars is permitted to a degree.

Efficiency has therefore to play with

one hand tied by politics. The London County Council hates the omnibuses. The newspapers which stand or fall by the Democratic party in the council never leave the traffic trust a moment's peace. Of course the street car enthusiast never sees a good point in the motor omnibus and the advocate for the motor omnibus permits himself the same ignorant enthusiasm.

In order to get at the true basis of comparison between New York and London it may be said that two out of the four determining factors of efficiency are to the advantages of New York so far as the underground transportation is concerned, namely, speed and service. The system of express on the subway by which passengers can be taken from one end of town to the other at the rate of twenty miles an hour is certainly the finest in the world so far as these two factors are concerned.

And so far as safety is concerned there is no real difference between the transportation of the two capitals. As to comfort, though, there is a real difference, a difference brought about probably by the totally different outlook of the London Englishman and the New York American. Broadly speaking, luxury does not exist in England; the fetish of the common worshiper is comfort. Luxury means getting a hundred cents and a bonus out of life's dollar. Comfort consists in tolerating existing circumstances. Carried to an illogical development the search for luxury results in continuous movement. The search for comfort merely results in rest and laziness. The Londoner pays for and gets not only transportation but a seat as well.

But all great bodies move slowly. New York is the largest city in the world and has the greatest amount of traffic of any city in the world. It still remains for the world's largest and busiest city to show the world how best numbers and traffic can be regulated.

Blaming Napoleon For Fate That Has Befallen France

IT may be that it is all the great Napoleon's fault that the French have not accomplished more than they have in the present war. At least that is the way an American professor of history and the science of war, Dr. R. M. Johnston, has it figured out. Napoleon was a great genius, Professor Johnston admits. He succeeded by the sheer force of his genius. But even at that he left out of account several factors which in the end cost him and France dearly.

At the very time when the growth of large armies was making necessary a new division of authority and a new conception of military strategy and science, Napoleon stolidly refused to delegate authority away from himself, was a man who could tolerate no will but his own. As a result he was often burdened with more details than even he, with his great genius could master, and his generals, left within sufficient initiative, often were forced into mistakes. Considering all the points of the march on Jena, Professor Johnston is inclined to believe that the praise given its strategy has done more harm than good to French military thought during all the years that have followed that campaign.

The growth of conscription armies made available large masses of men, and it also made men less precious, since the loss of a small, or even a considerable, part of the army could be borne with less risk to the whole. In the twelve years between Wattignies and Jena the French

infantry was improved in drill, and in discipline, under better officers than it had during the revolution. It still relied on small columns of attack, very mobile and adjustable, and arranged to make support from artillery effective and easy.

To supply and move the largely increased armies were, of course, the chief new problems which confronted military scientists of the time. As a compromise between the concentration and wide dispersal of forces there grew up the system known as distribution. As the value of strategic marches was increasingly recognized, so the importance of mobility became increasingly evident. As armies became larger, the shock of concentrated attack became less decisive than it had been in the old days of the small trained forces, and so it became safer to divide the troops of the new conscription army. Thus developed the concept of the great national force, subdivided into several co-operating armies.

In the problem of mobility was necessarily involved the division of authority. The Frederickian general had always had about five officers in control on the field. These men were close to him, and the soldiers could all be under his and their direct supervision. As armies grew, direct supervision became no longer possible. Much authority had to be left to the corps, and even to the division commander. It became very important to establish a good system of intercommunication. Subordinate officers must be left some free play for action on their own initiative, and it was the spirit

of free initiative which the French revolution breathed into the men of its armies.

Yet Napoleon was a man who could not tolerate any will but his own, and who therefore refused to permit much play to initiative. Therefore, although conscious as he was of his own boundless strength, he succeeded for a time by sheer force of his genius, still he lost sight of several factors which ultimately cost him very heavily. In order to make possible his system of highly individualized control, Napoleon developed to its limit the theory that armies should move from one central base of operations, have one line of communication, and be generally managed in closely correlated, if separate, units. He was determined to exercise the same dominant control that Frederick had had, no matter what were the dangers of such control.

Professor Johnston sketches the military situation of Prussia and of France at the time that they entered the campaign of 1806. Many material advantages were on the side of Prussia, but the force of Napoleon's genius and driving power broke them all down. The lecturer proceeded to the story of Napoleon's advance from Mainz upon Jena. The great commander, striving to do the work which now is properly subdivided among several staff officers, often slipped up on fairly important matters, despite his marvelous management of details, but still kept the general plan of his campaign clear and effective.

For his marching order he had now fully developed the scheme of the battalion carre. Each corps advancing in three lines, forming a sort of square, was by this method so subdivided, that if it was attacked at any point during the advance it would be equally easy to mass troops in support of the portion attacked, no matter at what point the pressure was brought to bear. It was also very easy to advance the corps into such attacking positions as would be most effective. Thus the advance upon Jena was very successfully made, and when the opposing forces did come into conflict, the advantage was all with the French, both for numerical strength and for strategic position.

Striking as an example of the danger and insufficiency of Napoleon's too individualized command, however, was one of the incidents of the battle of Jena. Duvou, at the extreme right, forced his marches so brilliantly that by the night of the thirteenth, he was already at the point which Napoleon had not expected him to reach until the fifteenth. Thus, in an advanced position, and left without support, it is a military miracle that Duvou was not completely destroyed. Berhadotte, who should have come to his relief, was not far distant, but had given drastic orders that applied only to himself, gave him no sufficient knowledge of the general situation, and hence no basis on which to take any vigorous initiative. He remained at Camburg, of no use to the French, and no harm to the Prussians.

